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Abstract
This paper exploits a Danish spatial dispersal policy on refugees which can be
regarded a natural experiment to investigate the influence of regional factors on
recent immigrants’ location choices.
The main push factors are lack of co-ethnics and presence of immigrants. Addi-
tional push factors are lack of access to jobs, education and housing which explain
why recent immigrants are attracted to large cities. Finally, placed refugees are sen-
sitive to regional unemployment and some evidence of welfare seeking is presented
as well.
JEL classifications: J15, R15 and H0.
Keywords: Location Choices, Push Factors, Immigrants.
1 Introduction
It is a common international phenomenon that the immigrant population is geographically
concentrated. In 1990, 63% of the foreign born population in the United States were
clustered in the four most populous states, California, New York, Florida and Texas,
where only 31% of the overall population lived (Zavodny 1997). In 1998, 52% of the
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foreign born population in Denmark lived in the metropolitan area where only 34% of the
overall population lived (Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs 1999).
Policymakers may believe that new immigrants are attracted to areas with large immi-
grant populations or that areas with low regional unemployment attract new immigrants.
Knowledge of factors influencing location choices of recent immigrants helps local poli-
cymakers anticipate which locations can expect to receive immigrants in the future. In
addition, legislators may want to consider potential eﬀects of governmental policies on
the location choices of new immigrants when changing policies.
Empirical investigation of immigrants’ location preferences is not an easy task. Al-
most all previous studies investigate immigrants’ location preferences using information
on immigrants’ first choice of location in the host country. However, estimates from a
standard choice model will not reflect preferences, if individual-specific costs of choosing
some regions over others are ignored. Suppose, for instance, that immigrants who are not
proficient in foreign languages have higher costs of settlement outside an ethnic enclave
than immigrants with foreign language proficiency. In that case, estimation of pull fac-
tors, i.e. the set of negative or positive social or economic factors in the potential areas
of destination which pulls migrants towards them (Lee 1966), will be biased. An alterna-
tive way of learning about immigrants’ location preferences is to estimate push factors,
i.e. the set of negative or positive social or economic factors in an area of origin which
pushes migrants away (Lee 1966), based on immigrants’ subsequent internal migration
pattern. However, in general push factor estimates may be biased due to location sort-
ing, which is present if location characteristics of the area of origin are correlated with
unobserved characteristics of the individual that also influence the migration probability.
This is likely to be the case, because in general individuals choose location of residence
themselves, in a non-random way, based on a number of determinants of migration some
of which are unobserved to the researcher. To give an example, suppose that individuals
who are not proficient in foreign languages are less prone to migrate. Suppose further that
new immigrants who are not proficient in foreign languages are more likely to settle in
the existing enclaves of co-ethnics in the hostcountry. Foreign language proficiency of new
immigrants is usually unobserved to the researcher. In that case, the correlation between
the probability of migration and ethnic enclave size may be driven by the unobserved
factor, foreign language proficiency.
This study exploits quasi-experimental data to determine determinants of recent im-
migrants’ location choices. The data stem from a governmental spatial dispersal policy
on refugees in Denmark in 1986-1998. The dispersal policy allows us to circumvent the
methodological problem of location sorting, because the policy implied that new refugees
were randomly distributed across locations in Denmark conditional on six refugee char-
acteristics largely observable in Danish administrative registers for the population of im-
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migrants. Controlling for these individual characteristics in the migration decision, the
initial location can be regarded as exogenous in the subsequent migration decision. In
this way the Danish spatial dispersal policy can be regarded as a natural experiment.
The paper takes advantage of the natural experiment to estimate push factors in placed
refugees’ subsequent migration decision. Due to the exogeneity of the initial location, the
push factor estimates are unaﬀected by initial location sorting. In contrast, some of
the estimated eﬀects of demographic characteristics of the individual on the subsequent
migration decision are correlations because they may have aﬀected the initial location.
Hence, they should not be given a causal interpretation and are therefore not reported.
An additional strength of the study is the data. We use Danish longitudinal micro data
for the population of refugees which allow for reconstruction of the residential history of a
refugee since the date of immigration. However, the location choice analysis is restricted to
the first migration investment because of the exogeneity of the initial location in contrast
to the endogeneity of subsequent locations. The main geographical unit of location used
in the study is a municipality, because the Danish spatial dispersal policy aimed at an
equal distribution of refugees, not only at the county level, but also at the municipality
level. Hence, a move across the municipality border is regarded as a migration investment.
The next section presents theory and empirical findings from previous studies on immi-
grants’ location choices. In Section 3, the institutional setting is described with emphasis
on the first Danish spatial dispersal policy carried out between 1986 and 1998. In Section
4, the methodology of the push factor analysis is presented. The section begins with a
formalisation of the migration decision problem faced by placed refugees and continues
with a presentation of the econometric specification of the migration model. Section 5
includes a short description of our micro data, descriptive evidence on placed refugees’
subsequent migration pattern and a short description of area of origin data to be included
as explanatory variables in the empirical models. In Section 6, the push factor estimates
are presented. It is shown that the two main push factors are a relatively low percentage
of his ethnic group that resides in the municipality of assignment and a relatively high
percentage of immigrants and their descendants that resides in the municipality of assign-
ment. In other words, placed refugees mainly react to lack of co-ethnics and presence of
immigrants in the municipality of assignment. Finally, conclusions and policy implications
are presented in Section 7.
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2 Recent Immigrants’ Location Choices: Theory and
Previous Findings
US studies on immigrants’ location choice find the presence of co-ethnics to be an im-
portant determinant of immigrants’ location choice (see e.g. Bartel 1989; Zavodny 1997;
Jaeger 2000; Bauer et al. 2002a; Bauer et al. 2002b). Diﬀerent theories have been put
forward to explain why this is so. First, there is the ethnic network hypothesis accord-
ing to which the presence of co-ethnics constitutes an ethnic network which facilitates
new immigrants’ adjustment to the new society (Piore 1979; Kobrin and Speare 1983).
Specifically, residence in an ethnic enclave strengthens feelings of security, solidarity and
identity within the group due to the common cultural background. Furthermore, the lo-
cal ethnic network may establish social institutions that support its members in relation
to the rest of the society. In addition, local ethnic labour markets may develop further
employment opportunities. Finally, the ethnic network may convey information about
employment opportunities outside the residential area. Second, there is the ethnic goods
theory proposed by Chiswick and Miller (2005) which emphasises that living in an ethnic
enclave reduces costs of consumption of so-called ethnic goods. Such goods are defined as
the consumption characteristics of an ethnic group not shared with the host population,
broadly defined to include market and non-market goods and services, including social
interactions for themselves and their children with people of the same origin. Finally,
there is the informational cascades or herd eﬀects theory suggested by Epstein (2002).
Herd eﬀects in location choice may exist if migrants have some private information about
diﬀerent locations and observe previous emigrants’ decisions, but are imperfectly informed
about the attributes of the alternative locations and about the information signal that
was driving previous emigrants’ decisions. An important implication of herd eﬀects is
that they may result in ineﬃciences. Some empirical evidence in favour of each of these
theories exists, see e.g. Bauer et al. (2002a) for supportive evidence of the ethnic network
theory, Chiswick and Miller (2005) for empirical evidence of the ethnic goods theory and
Bauer et al. (2002b) for empirical validation of the herd eﬀects theory. Note however, that
it is diﬃcult to identify the eﬀects of each of these three factors separately in econometric
analyses.
Presence of immigrants is also found to be an important determinant in some of the
US studies (Zavodny 1999; Jaeger 2000). Note however, that the study by Zavodny (1999)
does not control for presence of co-ethnics. Jaeger (2000) oﬀers a possible explanation,
namely that immigrants may prefer "international neighbours", without regard to their
country of origin.
A third demographic variable which has been found to attract new immigrants is
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local population size (Bartel 1989; Zavodny 1999; Jaeger 2000). Bartel (1989) oﬀers the
explanation that the local population size is correlated with job opportunities and general
economic activity.
Migration theory predicts that there may be other determinants of immigrants’ loca-
tion decision than presence of co-ethnics and other immigrant groups, including economic
factors such as regional unemployment, social benefit levels or eligibility rules or pub-
lic goods provision if interregional diﬀerences exist. US studies have found contrasting
evidence on this issue. Immigrants are found to be insensitive to local labour market con-
ditions in Bartel (1989) whereas Jaeger (2000) finds that all visa categories of immigrants,
except spouses of US citizens, are indeed sensitive to these conditions. Furthermore, the
empirical studies by Zavodny (1997) and Borjas (1999) have investigated the so-called
welfare magnets hypothesis, according to which new US immigrants are attracted to US
states with a relatively generous welfare system. Using macro data, Zavodny (1999) finds
no significant evidence of welfare seeking influencing immigrants’ settlement decision.
In contrast, using micro data, Borjas (1999) finds that immigrant welfare recipients are
much more likely to be geographically clustered in high-benefit states, notably in Califor-
nia, than immigrants who do not receive social benefits, and that they are more clustered
than natives. However, controlling for other factors which may potentially have influenced
the location decision, Borjas (1999) finds only weak empirical evidence of welfare magnets
in the sense of lack of statistical significance of the results.
Little research exists on the location choice of immigrants outside the US. The em-
pirical study by Åslund (2005) on the initial and subsequent location of immigrants to
Sweden during the 1980s is an important exception. Empirical findings of that study show
that refugees tend to leave locations with high overall unemployment and are attracted to
regions in which co-ethnics and other immigrants live and to regions with high immigrant
employment rates and high average earnings. On the other hand, Åslund finds no evidence
of direct welfare seeking. Note that the study by Åslund (2005) uses quasi-experimental
micro data that stem from the Swedish spatial dispersal policy on new refugees carried
out in the late 1980s. Åslund shows that using data with exogenous initial location is
important for estimating the eﬀects of local characteristics on subsequent migration; en-
dogenous location leads to underrating of their importance due to the initial sorting across
locations.
3 The Institutional Setting
Subsection 3.1 briefly describes the geographical settlement pattern of the immigrant
population in Denmark prior to the implementation of the first spatial dispersal policy on
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refugees in Denmark. In Subsection 3.2, main features of the first spatial dispersal policy
are presented.
3.1 Geographical Settlement Pattern of Immigrants
Denmark is administered at three levels: the state, the county and the municipal level.
Denmark has 275 municipalities; 273 of the municipalities constitute 14 counties. Copen-
hagen and Frederiksberg municipalities are excluded from the county division (Statistics
Denmark 1997, 39).
Table 1
Geographic distribution of the overall Danish population and of immigrants across counties
in 1985. Per cent.
Subgroup: All Immigrants
County:
Copenhagen and Frederiksberg municipalities 10.96 28.78
Copenhagen 11.91 19.62
Frederiksborg 6.59 8.94
Roskilde 4.14 3.50
West Zealand 5.48 3.35
Storstroem 5.03 2.57
Bornholm 0.92 0.33
Funen 8.90 5.97
Southern Jutland 4.88 5.06
Ribe 4.22 2.22
Vejle 6.40 3.54
Ringkoebing 5.18 2.04
Aarhus 11.44 8.75
Viborg 4.51 1.38
Northern Jutland 9.43 3.94
All 100.00 100.00
Frequencies 5,116,153 183,968
Source: Longitudinal administrative registers of Statistics Denmark on the immigrant pop-
ulation in Denmark 1984-2000.
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Table 1 presents the distribution of the overall Danish population and of the immigrant
population (immigrants and their descendants) across counties in 1985, i.e. the year
before the implementation of the first dispersal policy on refugees in Denmark. In 1985,
immigrants were highly overrepresented in Copenhagen and Frederiksberg municipalities
and Copenhagen County that constitute the Greater Copenhagen area (metropolitan area)
and, in addition, a neighbouring county of Copenhagen County, Frederiksborg County.
3.2 The Danish Spatial Dispersal Policy 1986-1998
1986 marks the start of the first Danish spatial dispersal policy on refugees and asylum
seekers who had just received a permit to stay for reasons of asylum.1 Henceforth, we refer
to such recognized refugees and asylum seekers as refugees. The Danish Government urged
the Danish Refugee Council to implement the dispersal policy after a surge of refugees
in the mid-eighties made it increasingly diﬃcult for the Council to satisfy the location
preferences of most new refugees for accommodation in the larger cities. The policy was
in force until 1999 under the charge of the Council. The Council’s assignment policy
aimed at promoting an equal share of refugees in all counties. At the county level, the
Council aimed at attaining an equal share of refugees in municipalities (local authority
districts) with suitable facilities for reception such as housing, educational institutions,
employment opportunities, and co-ethnics. In practice, these dispersal criteria implied
that refugees were provided with permanent housing in cities and towns and to a lesser
extent in the rural districts (Ministry of Internal Aﬀairs 1996). In 1987, 243 out of a total
of 275 municipalities in Denmark had received refugees (Danish Refugee Council 1987).
Dispersal was voluntary in the sense that only refugees who were unable to find hous-
ing themselves were subject to the dispersal policy. However, the take-up rate was high;
between 1986 and 1997 approximately 90% of refugees were provided with permanent
housing by the Council (or after 1995 by a local government) under the terms of the dis-
persal policy (Annual Reports of the Danish Refugee Council 1986-1994 and the Council’s
internal administrative statistics for 1995-1998).
Once settled, refugees participated in Danish language courses during an introductory
period of 18 months while receiving social assistance. Refugees were urged to stay in
the assigned municipality during the entire introductory period. However, there were no
relocation restrictions. Refugees could move away from the municipality of assignment at
1Until June 2002, Denmark gave asylum to Convention refugees, i.e. persons who were defined as
refugees according to the Geneva Convention from 1951, and to foreigners who were not defined as
refugees according to the Geneva Convention, but who for similar reasons as stated in the Convention
or other weighty reasons should not be required to return to the home country (’de facto’ refugees).
[Coleman and Wadensjö 1999, 249].
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any time, in so far as they could find alternative housing elsewhere. Receipt of welfare
was unconditional on residing in the assigned municipality.
The dispersal policy did, at least in the short run, influence the location pattern
of refugees. In 1993, the settlement pattern of refugees resembled that of the Danish
population and diﬀered greatly from that of non-western immigrants. 33% of refugees
and 26% of the Danish population lived in the capital or its suburbs while as much as
71% of non-western immigrants lived there. 56% of refugees and 59% of the Danish
population lived in towns outside the capital as opposed to only 24% of non-western
immigrants. The remaining shares lived in rural districts (Danish Refugee Council 1993).
Damm (2005) argues that the Danish spatial dispersal policy 1986-1998 gave rise
to a random initial residential distribution of refugees who were provided permanent
housing by the Council, conditional on seven characteristics of the individual at the time
of assignment: family size, health (in need of special treatment of medical or mental
health problems), special educational needs, the location of close relatives, nationality
(some nationalities were more likely to be placed in a large city than others), year of
immigration (over time it became increasingly diﬃcult for the Council to find housing in
the larger and medium-sized towns) as well as reluctance to accept assignment to a non-
preferred county. These governing factors suggest that non-single refugees with special
health treatment and educational needs and refugees with close family in Denmark near
whom they were determined to live and who arrived early in the observation period were
most likely to realise their preferred settlement option.
4 Methodology
The migration decision problem faced by a placed refugee is formalised in Subsection 4.1.
In Subsection 4.2, the econometric specification of the migration model is presented.
4.1 Migration Model
A placed refugee faces a problem of finding an optimal location in the host country, i.e. he
has to decide whether or not to move away from the municipality of assignment. We model
the migration decision in line with the human capital model according to which migration
is viewed as an investment that is expected to pay oﬀ in the form of increased earnings
or other kinds of pecuniary or non-pecuniary returns (Sjaastad 1962; Bowles 1970). Non-
money returns include changes in “psychic benefits” as a result of location preferences.
Similarly, costs include both money and non-money costs, such as costs of transport and
psychic costs, respectively. We model the migration decision as if the potential migrant
weights the net expected pecuniary and mental benefits of moving against the expected
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pecuniary and mental costs of moving. Migration will occur, if the former exceeds the
latter. The model presented is similar to the migration model by Nakosteen and Zimmer
(1980).
Let Ui1 denote the expected utility of individual i in location 1, the potential munici-
pality of destination. Similarly, let Ui0 denote the utility of individual i in location 0, the
municipality of assignment. Ci denotes the expected moving costs which are assumed to
be the same across destinations but not across individuals.
Individual i chooses to migrate if
M∗i > 0 (1)
and doesn’t migrate if
M∗i ≤ 0 (2)
where
M∗i = α0 + α1(Ui1 − Ui0)− Ci − εi (3)
α are parameters to be estimated and εi is a stochastic error term. According to
the migration decision equation (3), the migration propensity increases linearly with the
expected gains in utility and decreases linearly with the expected costs of migration.
However, the utility levels and expected costs of migration are not directly observed.
Assume that they are given by the following linear relations
Ui1 = θ01 +X 0iθ11 + Z
0
iθ21 + εi1 (4)
Ui0 = θ00 +X 0iθ10 + Z
0
iθ20 + εi0 (5)
Ci = γ0 +X
0
iγ1 + Z
0
iγ2 + εic (6)
where X is a vector of personal attributes of individual i and Z is a vector of regional
attributes of the origin locality and θ and γ are parameters to be estimated. εi1, εi0 and
εic are stochastic error terms. Equations (3)-(6) comprise the basic structural form of
the model. Substituting (4)-(6) into (3) gives the reduced form of the migration decision
equation:
M∗i = β0 +X
0
iβ1 + Z
0
iβ2 − ε∗i (7)
Then individual i0s probability of migration is given as
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Pr(M∗i > 0) (8)
We do not observe M∗, but only
Mi = 1 if M∗i > 0 (9)
and
Mi = 0 if M∗i ≤ 0 (10)
The variables included in the vectors X and Z are described in Section 5.
4.2 Econometric Specification
4.2.1 Mixed Proportional Hazard Model
The binary nature of the observed dependent variable in equation (9) suggests that the
parameters in the migration decision equation (7) could be estimated by maximum like-
lihood probit or logit techniques. Estimation of a probit or logit model would provide us
with estimates of the determinants of having migrated at a specific point in time. Instead
we will specify the theoretical model as a duration model to estimate the determinants of
migrating at a specific point in time, conditional on having resided in the municipality of
assignment up to this point in time.
Let the random variable T denote time until exit from the municipality of assignment.
Let X be the vector of initial values of personal attributes of individual i and Z be the
vector of initial values of regional attributes of the municipality of assignment. Let v be
time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity of individual i. Subscript i is suppressed below
for notational simplicity.
The key variable in duration models is the hazard rate which in continuous time is
defined as the transition rate out of the state of interest at time t, conditional on being
in the state at least until t, i.e.
h (t) = lim
dt→0
P (t < T ≤ t+ dt|T > t)
dt
(11)
The hazard function for exit from the municipality of assignment is specified as a
mixed proportional hazard (MPH) model
h(t|X,Z, v) = λ(t) · exp(X 0β1 + Z 0β2 + v) (12)
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λ(t) denotes the baseline hazard which captures duration dependence and exp(X 0β1+
Z 0β2 + v) is a scale function which captures the eﬀect of observed and unobserved
individual-specific characteristics.2
The likelihood contribution of a completed residential spell is given by the density
f(t|X,Z, v) = h(t|X,Z, v)exp(−
Z t
0
h(u|X,Z, v)du) (13)
while the likelihood of a right-censored residential spell is given by the probability of
no exit until time t
S(t|X,Z, v) = exp(−
Z t
0
h(u|X,Z, v)du) (14)
where S(t|X,Z, v) is the survivor function.
Definition of a non-censoring indicator d that takes the value 1 if a residential spell is
not right-censored and 0 otherwise then allows us to write the likelihood contribution of
a residential spell as
L = h(t|X,Z, v)d exp[−
Z t
0
h(u|X,Z, v)du] (15)
We choose a flexible model for the unobserved covariates. Let G denote the cumula-
tive distribution function for the unobserved covariate in the hazard rate, v. Then the
total likelihood contribution from a residential spell of an individual is the product of
the likelihood contribution of the residential spell integrated over the distribution of the
unobserved covariates
L =
Z
v
L(t|X,Z, v)dG(v) (16)
The intuition is that because an individual’s type is not known, the likelihood function
is a mixture over types weighted by their sample probabilities (Heckman and Singer 1984).
The marginal distribution of the unobserved term is specified as a discrete distribution
with two unrestricted mass point locations. Let vm, m = 1, 2 denote the two mass-points
of v. Each combination is observed with probability pi to be estimated, with 0 ≤ pi ≤ 1
for i = 1, 2 and
P2
i=1 pi = 1. We normalise the distribution of the unobserved term by
letting v1 = 0.
The baseline hazard function is assumed to be piecewise constant, i.e. λ(t) = exp(αk), k =
1, ...,K, where K is the number of intervals of the baseline hazard function. The length
of the baseline intervals is chosen by inspection of the empirical hazard function for exit
from the municipality of assignment, plotted in Figure 1 in Subsection 5.1.
2The main functional form implication of the proportional hazard model is that covariates are assumed
to have a proportional eﬀect on the baseline hazard.
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4.2.2 Model Identification
Given normalisations of the mean of the unobserved covariates (finite means) and weak
requirements for variation in the observed covariates, the MPH model is identified non-
parametrically if the observed covariates are independent of unobserved characteristics
influencing the outcome of interest, i.e. the probability of out-migration (Elbers and Rid-
der 1982). In particular, the latter identification condition implies that initial settlement
is independent of any unobservable individual-specific characteristic in the outcome equa-
tion. This requirement is satisfied if the refugee characteristics which have influenced the
initial settlement are observable so that we can control for them in the model.
As mentioned in Subsection 3.2, the related study Damm (2005) concludes that the
initial settlement of new refugees may have been influenced by family size, health, special
educational needs, location of close relatives, nationality, year of immigration as well as
reluctance to accept assignment to a non-preferred county. Three of these characteristics
are observed in Danish administrative registers (to be described in Subsection 5.1): family
status (measured by marital status and indicator variables for having children aged 0-2
and having children aged 3-17), nationality, and year of immigration. Moreover, Damm
(2005) argues that age and nationality may be decent proxies for special educational
needs, and that nationality and size of the ethnic stock may be decent proxies for whether
the individual had relatives in Denmark at the time of assignment. In contrast, the
registers do not contain any decent proxy for need of special treatment for medical or
mental health problems. However, there was no systematic mental health examination
of refugees at the time of assignment. Furthermore, since mental health problems are
taboos, they tend to be treated at a late stage, if treated at all. Whether a refugee was in
need of special mental treatment at the time of assignment is therefore likely to have had
little influence on initial settlement. Reluctance to accept assignment to a non-preferred
county is probably of minor importance: the combination of high take-up rates and low
reassignment rates indicates that only a small fraction of the refugees insisted on living
in a particular area.
Hence, the data at hand enables us to condition on the variables which may have
had a significant influence on the initial settlement of an individual. Therefore, it seems
reasonable to assume that regional attributes of the area of origin are independent of
unobserved characteristics of the individual. Consequently, the condition for identification
of area of origin covariates is satisfied.
12
5 Data
Our micro data is described in Subsection 5.1. Subsection 5.2 presents descriptive evidence
on placed refugees’ initial settlement and subsequent migration pattern. Area of origin
data is presented in Subsection 5.3.
5.1 Refugee Sample
Micro data on refugees is extracted from longitudinal administrative registers of Statis-
tics Denmark on the immigrant population in Denmark 1984-2000, henceforth referred
to as the immigrant data set. Our sample selection criteria result in a refugee sample
with information on 36,718 individuals of which 21,708 are men. Ideally, this sample
should cover observations on all adult refugees who were assigned to a municipality by
the Council under the terms of the spatial dispersal policy carried out 1986-1998. How-
ever, information on admission category of immigrants and the assignment municipality
of refugees is missing in the registers.
We take account of the first issue by applying an algorithm based on country of origin
and the first year of residence permit to Denmark to extract individuals from the 17
largest refugee-sending countries who immigrated between Oct. 1985 and Dec. 1997. The
algorithm was constructed from oﬃcial figures on the annual number of residence permits
granted to refugees by country of origin. The validity of the algorithm was investigated in
Damm (2005) by comparison of the ethnic composition of the extracted sample by year
of immigration, presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix, with the ethnic composition of
refugees granted asylum for each year according to oﬃcial statistics published by Statistics
Denmark. The algorithm was found to be valid, since the ethnic composition of the sample
is consistent with the oﬃcial ethnic composition of the refugee group, except that a few
refugee-sending countries from which only a small number of refugees originate are left
out of the extracted sample.
Solving the second data issue is further complicated by the fact that refugees may
initially have lived in temporary housing in proximity of the municipality to which they
were later assigned, on average after 1 year and in general after 3 months. This is the
reason for which we include refugees who immigrated in the last quarter of 1985 in the
refugee sample. We identify the municipality of assignment by using a rather complicated
algorithm which we constructed based on information on the Council’s internal admin-
istrative statistics on temporary housing. We define the first municipality of residence
observed in the registers as a municipality of temporary housing if the person relocates to
another municipality within the county within one year after receipt of residence permit.
Otherwise the first municipality is defined as the municipality of assignment.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics on residential spells.
Residential spell Frequency Distr. (%) Mean duration
Completed 14,326 39.02 27.92 (27.05)
Right-censored 22,392 60.98 74.10 (42.67)
All 36,718 100.00 56.08 (43.63)
Notes: Standard deviations are reported in parentheses.
Furthermore, we want to exclude family-reunified immigrants from refugee-sending
countries, because they were not subject to spatial dispersal, unless they immigrated
shortly after their spouse. We therefore exclude immigrants from refugee-sending coun-
tries, who at the time of immigration were married to one of the following: 1) an individual
born in Denmark, 2) an immigrant from a non-refugee-sending country or 3) an immi-
grant from a refugee-sending country who had immigrated at least one year earlier. We
exclude individuals who were neither observed in the registers in the year of immigration
nor in the following year, because in that case information on the initial municipality of
residence is missing. Unfortunately, the registers do not allow us to exclude the 10% of
refugees who turned down the Council’s oﬀer of housing under the terms of the spatial
dispersal policy. Finally, we include only individuals aged 18-66.The data set is informa-
tive about an individual’s county and municipality of residence (at the end of each year)
and the date of the last residential move (by the end of each year). Such information is
available because in Denmark it is determined by law to report your residential move to
the local municipality of destination within a fortnight after the move. These variables
enable us to construct spells for municipality of residence for each individual. The du-
ration of these spells is measured in months. Since the analysis concerns determinants
of the first migration investment after placement, we only follow an individual until the
end of the first spell, i.e. until an individual moves away from the initial municipality of
residence or until the end of year 2000 if the first spell is right-censored.
Descriptive statistics on residential spells are reported in Table 2. There is one res-
idential spell per individual in the refugee sample, namely the spell of residence in the
municipality of assignment. By 2000, 39% of the individuals have moved out of the mu-
nicipality of assignment. On average, movers make the first migration investment 28
months after settlement in the municipality of placement. As one would expect, the share
of movers is negatively correlated with the year of immigration: 58% of 1986 cohort of
refugees are movers compared to only 26% of the 1997 cohort of refugees.
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Figure 1. Empirical Hazard Function for Exit from Assigned Municipality
Figure 2. Empirical Survivor Function for Residence in Assigned Municipality
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The empirical hazard function for relocation out of the municipality of assignment is
plotted in Figure 1. The empirical hazard function peaks in month 13. The empirical
survivor function for residence in the municipality of assignment is plotted in Figure 2.
The figure shows that 15 years after initial settlement 48% of individuals in the sample
still live in the assigned municipality.
Furthermore, for each individual we have information on a wide variety of demographic
and socioeconomics characteristics of the individual. This allows us to include controls
for the personal attributes which may have aﬀected the initial location in the X vector of
personal attributes: marital status, children indicators, age and size of the ethnic stock
at the time of immigration as well as year of immigration and country of origin. Another
reason for including these personal attributes in the X vector is that they may aﬀect the
expected utility gain and costs of migration. The latter reason is also the reason for which
we include sex and years of education in the X vector. All variables included in the X
vector are defined in Table A.2 and their first two moments are shown in Table A.3 in the
Appendix.
5.2 Descriptive Evidence on Refugees’ Initial Settlement and
Migration Pattern
Table 3 shows the initial geographical distribution across counties of refugees in the refugee
sample (year of immigration Oct.1985-Dec.1997) and of refugees aged 18-66 who immi-
grated in the three years prior to the implementation of the spatial dispersal policy.
Comparison with the geographical distribution of the overall Danish population shown
in Table 1 reveals two facts. First, refugees who immigrated one or two years prior to
the implementation of spatial dispersal policy were just like the overall immigrant pop-
ulation highly overrepresented in the Greater Copenhagen area. Second, there is a close
correspondence between each county’s share of refugees and the population share of the
county with one exception, Copenhagen County. This confirms that the dispersal pol-
icy was successful in distributing new refugees equally across counties. This is also seen
by noting the large drop in the percentage of refugees who initially lived in the Greater
Copenhagen area in 1985. The drop occurred already in 1985 because of the dramatic
increase in the number of new refugees in 1985 which made it increasingly diﬃcult for
the Danish Refugee Council to help new refugees find housing in the Greater Copenhagen
area.
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Table 3
Initial geographic distribution of refugees aged 18-66 across counties.
By year of immigration. Per cent.
Year of immigration: 1983 1984 Jan.-Sept. 1985 Oct.1985-Dec.1997
County:
Copenhagen &
Frederiksberg munic. 23.14 29.96 10.14 10.02
Copenhagen 12.86 8.24 7.18 6.25
Frederiksborg 4.86 9.49 6.23 4.93
Roskilde 2.00 0.25 1.33 2.65
West Zealand 0.57 0.12 9.31 5.62
Storstroem 0.00 2.00 4.04 6.13
Bornholm 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75
Funen 23.71 7.99 12.14 11.25
Southern Jutland 2.00 0.25 6.16 4.75
Ribe 0.86 0.25 9.63 5.76
Vejle 2.00 0.37 9.60 8.32
Ringkoebing 0.86 1.75 3.78 5.04
Aarhus 22.29 25.47 8.20 12.52
Viborg 0.57 0.00 5.88 5.29
Northern Jutland 4.29 13.86 6.39 10.72
All 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Frequencies 350 801 3,147 36,718
Source: The immigrant data set and the refugee sample. Note that due to lack of immigrant
register data prior to 1984, the initial distribution across counties of the 1983 cohort refers to
its distribution across counties in 1984.
Turning to the extent to which placed refugees migrated subsequently, Table 4 shows
that by 1998 29% of the refugees in the refugee sample had moved to another county sub-
sequently. Interestingly, the share of migrants from a given county is, in general, close the
county’s share of placed refugees; this is seen by comparison with Table 2. Funen County
and Aarhus County constitute two exceptions by having a smaller share of out-migrants
than their share of placed refugees. This indicates that the fraction of out-migrants among
placed refugees is approximately equal, around 29%, across counties. The three most pop-
ulated counties, Copenhagen and Frederiksberg municipalities, Copenhagen County and
Aarhus County which together account for 35% of the Danish population, were the choice
of destination for 54% of the migrants. The migrants mainly come from within the same
region.
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Table 4
 Migration pattern at the county level for first-time migrants among placed refugees. Per cent of movers from and to each county.
County of Copenhagen & Copen- Frederiks- Roskilde West Storstroem Bornholm Funen Southern Ribe Vejle Ring- Aarhus Viborg Northern % of 
destination: Frederiksberg hagen borg  Zealand Jutland koebing Jutland movers
County of municipalities from 
assignment: destination:
Copenhagen
& Frederiks-
berg munic. 0 7.03 1.08 0.76 0.27 0.21 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.28 0.05 0.13 10.37
Copenhagen 5.08 0 0.51 0.75 0.05 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.01 0.04 6.86
Frederiksborg 3.21 1.48 0 0.42 0.23 0.09 0 0.11 0.02 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.13 6.01
Roskilde 1.50 1.12 0.16 0 0.13 0.18 0 0.10 0.02 0.01 0.02 0 0.13 0.04 0.13 3.54
West Zealand 2.39 1.51 0.51 0.80 0 0.23 0 0.31 0.10 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.60 0.11 0.19 7.54
Storstroem 1.87 1.34 0.62 0.47 0.72 0 0 0.37 0.10 0.30 0.24 0.18 0.56 0.02 0.26 7.04
Bornholm 0.04 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.07 0.02 0 0.01 0.08 0 0.07 0 0.04 0 0.01 0.40
Funen 1.39 0.59 0.46 0.14 0.26 0.84 0 0 0.47 0.37 0.84 0.31 0.85 0.17 0.22 6.91
South. Jutland 1.26 0.38 0.25 0.21 0.17 0.08 0.01 0.64 0 0.83 0.55 0.22 0.93 0.02 0.18 5.73
Ribe 1.71 0.65 0.31 0.22 0.11 0.12 0 0.74 0.48 0 0.94 0.29 1.07 0.05 0.23 6.92
Vejle 1.13 0.60 0.09 0.06 0.40 0.11 0 1.21 0.44 0.52 0 0.40 1.68 0.11 0.19 6.95
Ringkoebing 0.81 0.30 0.12 0.11 0.31 0.06 0.01 0.27 0.25 0.85 0.50 0 0.68 0.11 0.16 4.68
Aarhus 1.76 0.72 0.37 0.28 0.16 0.18 0 0.63 0.46 0.52 1.83 0.49 0 0.31 0.72 8.44
Viborg 1.05 0.48 0.26 0.06 0.27 0.23 0 0.52 0.35 0.37 0.79 0.57 2.10 0 0.53 7.58
North. Jutland 2.20 0.93 0.47 0.31 0.29 0.33 0 0.85 0.91 0.59 0.68 0.57 2.45 0.46 0 11.03
% of movers 
to destination 25.40    17.15     5.24     4.60     3.44     2.74     0.11     5.98     3.76     4.80     6.99     3.48    11.55     1.62     3.14   100.00
Source: The refugee sample.
Note: Total number of first-time migrants among placed refugees: 10,491.
Table 5
In- and out-migration rates of first-time refugee migrants at the county level.
County: Number of Out-migration In-migration Net migration
placed refugees rate rate rate
Copenhagen &
Frederiksberg munic. 3,678 0.30 0.73 0.43
Copenhagen 2,294 0.31 0.78 0.47
Frederiksborg 1,810 0.35 0.30 -0.05
Roskilde 972 0.38 0.50 0.12
West Zealand 2,065 0.38 0.18 -0.21
Storstroem 2,249 0.33 0.13 -0.20
Bornholm 276 0.15 0.04 -0.11
Funen 4,130 0.18 0.15 -0.02
Southern Jutland 1,745 0.34 0.23 -0.12
Ribe 2,116 0.34 0.24 -0.11
Vejle 3,056 0.24 0.24 0.00
Ringkoebing 1,849 0.27 0.20 -0.07
Aarhus 4,596 0.19 0.26 0.07
Viborg 1,944 0.41 0.09 -0.32
Northern Jutland 3,938 0.29 0.08 -0.21
All 36,718 0.29 0.29 0.00
Source: The refugee sample.
Table 5 reports the out- and in-migration rates of placed refugees relative to the
number of refugees initially placed in the county. The out-migration rate is calculated as
the share of refugees placed in the county during the observation period who move across
the county. The in-migration rate is calculated as the number of first-time movers among
placed refugees who move to the county out of the total number of refugees initially placed
in the county. It becomes apparent that the migration pattern just described in terms
of the initial distribution of refugees implies very high positive net in-migration rates for
the two counties in the capital, Copenhagen County and Copenhagen and Frederiksberg
municipalites, and a more moderate positive net in-migration rate for Aarhus County in
which the second largest city in Denmark, Aarhus, is situated. With one exception, all
remaining counties have negative net in-migration rates of first-time movers among placed
refugees.
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Table 6
Geographic distribution of subgroups of the Danish population across counties in 2000. Per
cent.
Subgroup: All Immigrants Pre-reform refugees Refugee sample
County:
Copenhagen &
Frederiksberg munic. 11.03 25.06 27.24 16.46
Copenhagen 11.50 17.01 13.92 8.91
Frederiksborg 6.88 6.94 4.92 4.42
Roskilde 4.36 3.68 2.30 2.82
West Zealand 5.55 3.80 2.24 4.09
Storstroem 4.85 2.88 1.85 4.52
Bornholm 0.83 0.41 0.03 0.70
Funen 8.83 7.25 11.99 11.14
Southern Jutland 4.73 4.02 1.59 4.07
Ribe 4.22 2.75 2.76 5.12
Vejle 6.53 4.72 3.84 8.54
Ringkoebing 5.11 2.96 2.98 4.60
Aarhus 11.98 11.07 17.50 13.55
Viborg 4.37 2.03 1.65 3.33
Northern Jutland 9.25 5.27 5.20 7.76
All 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Frequencies 5,349,212 412,528 3,520 31,184
Notes: Pre-reform refugees refer to 1983-Oct.1985 cohorts of refugees. Source: The immi-
grant data set and the refugee sample.
Table 6 presents evidence that the spatial dispersal policy on refugees was successful
in augmenting spatial dispersion of refugees relative to other immigrants in the medium
run. In 2000, refugees who had been subject to the first Danish spatial dispersal policy
were overrepresented in Copenhagen and Frederiksberg municipalities to a much lesser
extent than the overall immigrant population and pre-reform refugees and they were
in fact underrepresented in Copenhagen County which had the second highest share of
immigrants in 2000. In contrast to the overall immigrant population, individuals in the
refugee sample were instead slightly overrepresented in the counties in which the second
and third largest cities in Denmark are situated, Aarhus County (Aarhus) and Funen
County (Odense). Individuals in the refugee sample were only slightly underrepresented
in most of the remaining counties.
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5.3 Area of Origin Data
Regional attributes of the municipality of assignment which we believe may aﬀect placed
refugees’ subsequent migration propensity fall into three cateogories: 1) demographic
attributes, 2) labour market attributes and 3) housing market attributes.
Concerning demograhic attributes, placed refugees are likely to derive high utility
from living in the same location as co-ethnics according to the two hypotheses described in
Section 2: 1) the ethnic network hypothesis by Piore (1979) and Kobrin and Speare (1983)
and 2) the ethnic goods hypothesis by Chiswick and Miller (2005). These two hypotheses
imply that the expected utility gain decreases and the expected costs of migration increase
with the size of the ethnic enclave in the municipality of assignment. Therefore, the
ethnic enclave size in the municipality of assignment unambigously decreases the migration
probability. We follow Bartel (1989) by including the percentage of co-ethnics in the host
country living in the municipality of assignment in the Z vector to capture the relative
size of ethnic enclave. This variable is labelled ’PCETH’.
New refugees may prefer international neighbours, possibly for reasons of solidarity. If
so, the expected utility gain from migration and migration propensity is likely to decrease
with the relative size of the immigrant enclave in the municipality of assignment. To
explore this, we include the percentage of immigrants in the host country living in the
municipality of assignment in the Z vector. Trying to capture the eﬀect of presence of
immigrants in this way corresponds to the way in which we attempt to capture the eﬀect
of presence of co-ethnics. We label the variable ’PCIMM’.
We believe that placed refugees prefer to live in a large city, due to a preference for
residing near airports which facilitate contact with old networks abroad, due to access to
a large variety of goods and services in general and due to urban populations being more
accustomed to interactions with foreigners. If so, current residence in a large city decreases
the expected utility gain from migration and increases the expected costs of migration,
unambigously decreasing the migration probability. To test this hypothesis, we include
the logarithmic value of number of inhabitants in the municipality of assignment in the Z
vector and label it by ’LNPOP’. Similarly, placed refugees may in particular prefer to live
in the capital, Copenhagen, due to capital-specific local amenities. If so, initial residence
in Copenhagen decreases the net expected utility gain from moving and as a consequence
the migration probability. To test this hypothesis, we include an indicator variable for
initial residence in the Greater Copenhagen area and label it ’METRO’.
Turning to labour market attributes of the municipality of assignment which may aﬀect
placed refugees’ migration probability, we believe that refugees prefer living in a location
with favourable employment prospects which we believe are negatively correlated with the
regional unemployment rate and positively correlated with general economic activity. The
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expected utility gain of migration accordingly increases with the regional unemployment
rate and decreases with the general economic activity. As a consequence, the migration
probability will increase with the regional unemployment rate and decrease with the
general economic activity. To test this hypothesis, we include the regional unemployment
rate as a variable in Z and label it ’UNRATE’. To capture the eﬀect of general economic
activity, we include the percentage of jobs in the county situated in the municipality of
assignment, labelled ’PCJOB’. We believe that there is a positive correlation between
these two factors. Note also that inclusion of PCJOB allows us to test the suggestion
by Bartel (1989) that her finding that recent immigrants’ are attracted to locations with
large local populations captures the eﬀect of more job opportunities and higher general
economic activity in cities compared to rural and smaller urban areas.
Social assistance rules, including entitlement rules, are the same across Danish munic-
ipalities. As a consequence, welfare generosity is unlikely to aﬀect placed refugees’ utility
levels. However, municipal variation in the administration of social assistance rules may
exist, for instance in the extent to which social assistance recipients are required to par-
ticipate in active labour market programmes. To capture the eﬀect of use of active labour
market participation rather than passive income support, we include the percentage of
right-wing votes at the local election, labelled ’PCRVOTE’, because we believe that right-
wing dominated municipalities are more prone to use active labour market participation
than left-wing dominated municipalities. We believe that the migration probability in-
creases with PCRVOTE, because some individuals may prefer to leave the municipality
of assignment to avoid active labour market training. This eﬀect is similar to the threat
eﬀect, i.e. that individuals who are about to be assigned to an active labour market
programme tend to begin in an ordinary job in order to avoid programme participation,
which has been shown to a major employment-promoting eﬀect of active labour market
programmes in Denmark (Rosholm and Svarer 2004).
Education opportunities may be an additional factor aﬀecting recent immigrants’,
especially refugees’, utility levels. First, due to lack of education from the source country.
Second, due to lack of approval of foreign educations in the host country. Third, due to a
need for upgrading the skill level for employability in the host country labour market, for
instance due to a high minimum wage and a mismatch between low-skilled job demand
and supply in the host country. In particular, we believe that the expected utility gain
from migration decreases with the availability of institutions for attainment of qualifying
educations in the municipality of assignment. As a consequence the migration probability
decreases with the availability of educational institutions. To capture the availability,
we include the number of institutions for qualifying educations in the municipality of
assignment, labelled ’EDUCINST’.
Turning to housing market attributes which may aﬀect utility levels of placed refugees,
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such attributes are important to include because relocations out of the municipality of
residence may include short-distance relocations which tend to be carried out for housing
consumption adjustment reasons. We expect the local residence oﬀer arrival rate to
increase with the number of rental units and number of social housing units in per cent of
the total local housing stock, because new immigrants in Denmark tend to live in rental
housing, especially in social housing. In fact, according to Danish law, immigrants are
not allowed to buy property during the first five years of stay in Denmark. The higher the
share of rental and social housing units in the municipality of assignment, the lower is the
migration probability out of the municipality of assignment likely to be, since adjustment
of housing consumption can more easily take place within the municipality of assignment
when shares of rental and social housing units are high. We label these two housing
variables ’PCRHOUS’ and ’PCSHOUS’.
The variables included in the Z vector are defined in Table A.2 and their first two
moments are shown in Table A.3 in the Appendix.
6 Push Factor Results
We have estimated six diﬀerent versions of the MPH model, denoted model 1-6 below.
The models diﬀer with respect to which location characteristics variables are included
as explanatory variables. In model 1, we have included three demographic characteris-
tics and one labour market characteristic of the municipality of assignment which have
been found to aﬀect immigrants’ location choices in previous studies: LNPOP, PCIMM,
PCETH and UNRATE. In model 2, one additional demographic characteristic is included:
METRO. Relative to model 2, model 3 also contains housing market characteristics: PC-
SHOUS and PCRHOUS. Relative to model 3, model 4 contains one additional labour
market characteristic: PCRVOTE. Relative to model 4, model 5 contains the additional
labour market variable: EDUCINST. Finally, model 6 diﬀers from model 5 by having one
additional labour market characteristic: PCJOB. The parameter estimates of regional
attributes of the municipality of assignment, β2, are reported for each model in Table 7.
3
According to model 1, the hazard rate of relocation out of the municipality of as-
signment significantly decreases with LNPOP and PCETH. Both of these results are in
accordance with Bartel (1989), Jaeger (2000) and Åslund (2005). The first result is also
in accordance with Zavodny (1999). The latter result is also in accordance with Bauer et
al. (2002a; 2002b). In contrast, the hazard rate of relocation out of the municipality of
assignment significantly increases with PCIMM. This result contradicts the result found
by Zavodny (1999), Jaeger (2000) and Åslund (2005) that recent immigrants are attracted
3The full set of estimation results are available on request.
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to locations in which earlier immigrants live. We will oﬀer a possible explanation for this
contradiction at the end of the section. Finally, in accordance with Bartel (1989) but in
contradiction to Jaeger (2000), UNRATE is estimated to have an insignificant eﬀect on
the hazard rate of relocation.
Turning to model 2, inclusion of METRO only causes insignificant changes in the co-
eﬃcient estimates of the four variables in Z which were also included in model 1. Further-
more, in contrast to our prior beliefs, the hazard rate of relocation out of the municipality
of assignment significantly increases with initial residence in Greater Copenhagen. This
result does not support our belief that placed refugees have higher utility levels in Greater
Copenhagen than else where, on the contrary. A possible explanation for this finding is
that relocations out of municipalities in Greater Copenhagen tend to be carried out in or-
der to adjust housing consumption. This is supported by the descriptive evidence shown
in Table 3 that cross-county relocations within the Greater Copenhagen area actually
account for 29% of the total cross-county relocations of placed refugees to the Greater
Copenhagen area.
However, this explanation is not supported by the estimated model 3. Inclusion of
housing market attributes into the model does not make the coeﬃcient of METRO in-
significant. In contrast, the coeﬃcient estimate becomes larger and the t-statistic in-
creases. Inclusion of housing market variables instead decreases the coeﬃcient estimate
and t-statistic of LNPOP. The interpretation is that refugees prefer living in large cities,
partly because it facilitates access to housing. In line with our prior beliefs, the hazard
rate of relocation decreases both with PCSHOUS and PCRHOUS.
Turning to model 4, the hazard rate of relocation increases with PCRVOTE. This
result supports our prior belief that refugees’ utility levels are decreasing in the use of
active labour market participation rather than passive income support for unemployed
individuals. Inclusion of the variable leaves the coeﬃcient estimates of the location char-
acteristic variables included in model 3 unchanged, except that the coeﬃcient estimate
of UNRATE changes sign; it becomes positive, but remains insignificant. It shows that
there is a negative correlation between UNRATE and PCRVOTE.
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Table 7
MPH model coeﬃcient estimates.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Demographic attributes:
LNPOP/100 -63.135 (-50.365) -63.165 (-50.189) -43.475 (-25.036) -43.501 (-24.858) -2.639 (-1.121) -1.226 (-0.474)
PCIMM/10 0.760 (28.716) 0.681 (22.121) 0.377 (9.372) 0.421 (10.203) 0.827 (13.950) 0.956 (13.130)
PCETH/10 -0.271 (-10.710) -0.246 (-9.441) -0.246 (-9.401) -0.254 (-9.722) -0.270 (-10.195) -0.280 (-10.579)
METRO - - 0.163 (4.732) 0.543 (14.645) 0.512 (13.652) 0.437 (10.516) 0.384 (8.482)
Labour market attributes:
UNRATE/10 -0.037 (-0.779) -0.038 (-0.814) -0.073 (-1.573) 0.024 (0.490) 0.137 (2.659) 0.144 (2.791)
PCRVOTE/100 - - - - - - 0.531 (5.794) 0.586 (6.332) 0.606 (6.518)
EDUCINST/100 - - - - - - - - -5.383 (-11.752) -2.922 (-5.230)
PCJOB/100 - - - - - - - - - - -1.231 (-5.078)
Housing market attributes:
PCSHOUS/100 - - - - -1.747 (-11.395) -1.540 (-9.614) -1.633 (-10.170) -1.514 (-9.160)
PCRHOUS/100 - - - - -0.762 (-4.217) -0.665 (-3.670) -1.838 (-10.066) -1.875 (-9.994)
Notes:
Dependent variable: hazard rate of relocation out of assigned municipality.
t-statistics are reported in parentheses.
Controls for demographic and socio-economic characteristics of the individual are included.
Controls for time-invariant unobserved characteristics of the individual are included.
Number of residential spells: 36,718. Number of relocations: 14,326.
EDUCINST included in model 5 is seen to be significantly negative, i.e. the hazard
of relocation decreases with EDUCINST as we expected. Inclusion of the variable causes
significant changes in the coeﬃcient estimate of two of the other location characteristic
variables in the model: LNPOP and UNRATE. The coeﬃcient estimate of LNPOP drops
substantially and becomes insignificant. The interpretation is that refugees’ utility levels
increase with local population size, partly because access to educational institutions in-
creases with local population size. The coeﬃcient estimate of UNRATE becomes larger
and significantly positive, i.e. now the hazard rate of relocation increases with UNRATE,
as we would expect it to do. The interpretation for the coeﬃcient increase is that UN-
RATE is positively correlated with EDUCINST, but the two factors aﬀect refugees’ utility
levels in opposite ways.
Turning to the final model, model 6, the hazard rate of relocation decreases with
PCJOB. Specifically, one percentage point increase in PCJOB decreases the hazard rate
of relocation by 1% [(exp(-1.231/100)-1)*100]. Inclusion of the variable further decreases
the coeﬃcient estimate of LNPOP. This supports the suggestion by Bartel (1989) that re-
cent immigrants are attracted to locations with large local populations because of more job
opportunities and higher general economic activity in cities compared to rural and smaller
urban areas. Inclusion of the variable also decreases the coeﬃcient of EDUCINST, but
it remains significant. In particular, one additional institution for qualifying educations
decreases the hazard rate relocation by 3% [(exp(-2.922/100)-1)*100]. The remaining co-
eﬃcients of regional attributes are unaﬀected by the inclusion of PCJOB. Their marginal
eﬀects are as follows. One percentage point increase in PCETH decreases the hazard rate
by 3% [(exp(-0.28/10)-1)*100] ceteris paribus. One percentage point increase in PCIMM
increases the hazard rate by 10% [(exp(0.956/10)-1)*100] ceteris paribus. METRO in-
creases the hazard rate by 47% [(exp(0.384)-1)*100]. One percentage point increase in
PCSHOUS decreases the hazard rate of relocation by 1.5% [(exp(-1.514/100)-1)*100].
The eﬀect of a corresponding change in PCRHOUS is 2% [(exp(-1.875/100)-1)*100]. One
percentage point increase in the per cent of right-wing votes increases the hazard rate of
relocation by 1% [(exp(0.606/100)-1)*100].
Note that the marginal eﬀect of PCETH is robust across model specifications. The
marginal eﬀect of PCIMM is fairly robust as well. Note also that LNPOP has an insignif-
icant eﬀect on the hazard rate of relocation, because its eﬀect is captured by the eﬀect
of housing and labour market attributes on the hazard rate of relocation. To summarize,
refugees prefer living in large cities because it facilitates access to housing, educational
institutions and jobs.
The estimated hazard function of the final model, model 6, is plotted in Figure A.1 in
the Appendix, for an individual with mean observable and unobservable characteristics.
The corresponding estimated survivor function is plotted in Figure A.2 in the Appendix.
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We now return to the issue of the finding that the hazard rate of relocation out of
the municipality of assignment significantly increases with PCIMM. Previous empirical
studies of immigrants’ location choices which have investigated whether location choices
are aﬀected by presence of immigrants have chosen to capture the potential eﬀect by in-
clusion of the number of immigrants in location j in per cent of the number of inhabitants
in location j (Zavodny 1999; Jaeger 2000, Åslund 2005). Denote this variable ’foreign
born population share’ as in (Zavodny 1999). Similarly, let the variable ’ethnic group
population share’ denote the number of immigrants from an individual’s source country
in location j in per cent of the number of inhabitants in location j. We have instead in-
cluded PCIMM and PCETH. The reason for this is that we believe that what matters for
immigrants’ location choices is not ’foreign born population share’, or ’ethnic group pop-
ulation share’, but rather the size of the immigrant/ethnic enclave in location j relative
to the size of immigrant/ethnic enclaves elsewhere in the country. To test this hypothe-
sis, we have estimated a model which diﬀers from model 6 in two aspects: PCIMM and
PCETH are substituted by ’foreign born population share’ and ’ethnic group population
share’.4 The estimation results show that the coeﬃcient estimate of ’foreign born popu-
lation share’ is negative but insignificant at conventional significance levels and that the
coeﬃcient estimate of ’ethnic group population share’ is negative and significant only at a
5% significance level. Both of these results support our belief that it is the relative size of
the immigrant/ethnic enclave that matters for recent immigrants’ location choices. Fur-
thermore, inclusion of ’foreign born population share’ and ’ethnic group population share’
instead of PCIMM and PCETH changes some of the coeﬃcients of the other variables
of regional attributes. First, UNRATE changes sign into an insignificant, negative sign.
Second, PCJOB changes sign into a significant, positive sign. Both signs contradict our
prior beliefs. Third, the coeﬃcient of PCRHOUS turns positive, but insignificant, also in
contradiction to our prior belief. Finally, the absolute value of the coeﬃcient of LNPOP
increases dramatically, again contradicting the our prior belief that recent immigrants
tend to prefer living in large urban areas at least in part because general economic activ-
ity as measured by per cent county jobs is larger there than elsewhere. The coeﬃcients
of the remaining location characteristics variables are robust to the variable substitution.
To conclude the discussion of the eﬀect of presence of immigrants on recent immigrants’
location choices, we believe that a relatively large immigrant enclave is in fact a push fac-
tor in placed refugees’ relocation decision. In general, refugees do not prefer international
neighbours, on the contrary. Possible explanations for this finding should be investigated
in future research.
4The estimation results are available on request.
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7 Concluding Remarks
The results presented in this article give us further insight into the factors aﬀecting recent
immigrants’ location choices.
First, the results shed light on the question asked in the literature whether recent
immigrants prefer living where co-ethnics as well as immigrants from other countries of
origin settled earlier. The results presented show that refugees who were assigned to
an initial location by the authorities under the terms of the spatial dispersal policy in
Denmark carried out from 1986-1998 prefer living where co-ethnics have settled earlier.
In contrast, presence of immigrants is in fact a push factor in placed refugees’ relocation
decision. Explanations for the latter result should be investigated in future research.
Furthermore, it should be investigated in the future whether this result holds for all
immigrants, irrespective of admission category and cohorts. If so, it has very important
implications for research on the causes of ethnic segregation, because it implies that
immigrant neighbourhoods in the large cities in Europe and the US with typically many
diﬀerent nationalities are not a consequence of immigrants’ preference for international
neighbours but instead a consequence of immigrants’ restricted neighbourhood choices in
the large cities.
Second, the results provide evidence on why recent immigrants are attracted to large
cities. The results show that placed refugees prefer living in large cities because it fa-
cilitates access to jobs, housing and institutions for attainment of qualifying educations.
Third, the results provide evidence on the question raised in the literature whether recent
immigrants’ location choices are aﬀected by economic factors, in particular employment
prospects and welfare generosity. The results show that placed refugees do indeed re-
act to relatively high regional unemployment by moving to another location. However,
placed refugees also react to settlement in a right-wing dominated location by moving to
another location. This could be due to a wider use of active labour market participation
as a requirement for social assistance receipt in right-wing dominated locations rather
than passive income support. If so, the result could be interpreted as evidence of welfare
seeking.
To the extent that the set of results presented in this paper holds for all admission cat-
egories of immigrants, policy makers should expect new immigrants to settle in large cities
in neighbourhoods in which earlier cohorts of co-nationals have settled. However, from
a labour market assimilation point of view recent immigrants’ preference for living with
co-ethnics should not necessarily cause policymakers’ concern. The high-quality empirical
investigation on the eﬀect of living in an ethnic enclave on labour market assimilation of
immigrants by Edin et al. (2003) exploits the Swedish spatial dispersal on refugees to take
location sorting into account. The results of the study show that residence in an ethnic
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enclave increases earnings of refugees eight years after immigration. The results of the
study could well generalize to the labour market assimilation experience of immigrants in
other countries.
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Appendix
Table A.1 reports the year of immigration and country of origin of individuals extracted
from the immigrant data set to the refugee sample. Table A.2 reports the definitions and
primary sources of data for the variables used in the empirical analysis. Table A.3 presents
means and standard deviations of the variables used in the empirical analysis. Figure
A.1 shows the estimated hazard function for exit from the assigned municipality, for an
individual with mean observable and unobservable characteristics. The corresponding
estimated survivor function is plotted in Figure A.2
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Table A.1
Individuals in the refugee sample.
By year of immigration and country of origin.
Year: 1985* 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 Total
Citizenship:
Europe: 61 190 190 188 149 41 0 0 0 76 10,372 2,473 996 14,736
Poland 55 171 173 167 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 566
Rumania 6 19 17 21 149 41 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 253
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 9,688 1,343 899 11,935
Serbia-Montenegro 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 25 10 38
Croatia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 9 131 16 15 171
Macedonia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5 39 11 6 61
Slovenia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 9 6 7 28
Yugoslavia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 51 502 1,072 59 1,684
Africa: 14 70 44 17 97 88 241 244 441 305 298 439 293 2,591
Ethiopia 14 70 44 17 27 15 12 17 11 41 12 12 9 301
Somalia 0 0 0 0 70 73 229 227 430 264 286 427 284 2,290
Uganda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
America: 6 11 12 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37
Chile 6 11 12 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 37
Asia: 765 2,731 1,161 1,093 1,125 1,013 1,130 1,324 985 592 861 862 833 14,475
Afghanistan 11 31 11 16 27 37 87 47 55 71 101 110 112 716
Iraq 123 256 145 279 274 216 240 599 508 265 487 474 529 4,395
Iran 508 770 630 603 429 365 384 225 164 94 66 167 137 4,542
Sri Lanka 97 1,534 292 18 45 37 98 104 83 112 150 67 28 2,665
Vietnam 26 140 83 177 350 358 321 349 175 50 57 44 27 2,157
No citizenship: 258 1,290 794 481 616 354 395 472 67 45 42 34 31 4,879
Total: 1,104 4,292 2,201 1,787 1,987 1,496 1,766 2,040 1,493 1,018 11,573 3,808 2,153 36,718
* From October 1985 to December 1985
Table A.2. Part A.
Variable definitions and primary sources of data. 
Variable Definition Primary source of data
Individual characteristics:
Sex Dummy for sex. Population register,
Statistics Denmark (DST).
Age Age. Population register, DST. 
Married Dummy for being married. Population register, DST. 
Children aged 0-2 Dummy for presence of children Population register, DST. 
between 0 and 2 years of age
in the household.
Children aged 3-17 Dummy for presence of children Population register, DST. 
between 3 and 17 years of age
in the household.
Country of origin Dummy for immigrant source country. Population register, DST. 
Year of immigration Dummy for first year of receipt of Population register, DST. 
residence permit.
Years of education Number of years of education prior Surveybased register on
to immigration constructed from immigrants' education level 
an education code of highest attained prior to immigration, DST.
degree attained prior to immigration.
Ethnic stock Number of immigrants and Population register, DST. 
descendants of immigrants from Author's calculations based on
immigrant source country in Denmark. 100 per cent sample of immigrants.
Municipality characteristics:
METRO Dummy for residence in Copenhagen Population register, DST. 
or Frederiksberg municipalities or in
Copenhagen County.
POP Number of inhabitants in municipality j . Population statistics
(population counted data), DST. 
PCIMM Number of immigrants and descendants Population register, DST. 
of immigrants residing in municipality j Author's calculations based on
in per cent of the total number of 100 per cent sample of immigrants.
immigrants and descendants in Denmark.
Table A.2. Part B.
Variable definitions and primary sources of data. 
Variable Definition Primary source of data
Municipality characteristics
PCETH Number of immigrants and descendants Population register, DST. 
of immigrants from source country k Author's calculations based on
residing in municipality j in per cent of 100 per cent sample of immigrants.
the total number of immigrants and
descendants from source country k  in
Denmark.
UNRATE The unemployment rate in a radius Unemployment register
of DKK 60 (approx. USD 10) (population counted data), DST,
of transport around the largest and cost of transport statistics, 
post office in municipality j . the Ministry of Transport.
Constructed by Local
Government Studies.
PCRVOTE Sum of votes for the Liberal Party and Election statistics, DST. 
the Conservative People's Party in per 
cent of the sum of votes for the Liberal 
Party, the Conservative People's Party,
the Social Democratic Party and
the Socialist People's Party 
at the latest municipal election.
The two former parties are traditional, 
right-wing parties whereas the latter 
two are traditional, left-wing parties.
EDUCINST Number of institutions for vocational Integrated pupil register 
and higher education in municipality j. (population counted data), DST.
PCJOB Number of individuals employed Registerbased labour force
in municipality j  in per cent of statistics (population counted
the total number of individuals data), DST.
employed in the county.
PCSHOUS Number of social housing dwellings Buildings and housing statistics
for all-year residence in per cent of the (population counted data), DST.
total number of dwellings
for all-year residence in municipality j. 
PCRHOUS Number of rental housing dwellings Buildings and housing statistics
for all-year residence in per cent of the (population counted data), DST.
total number of dwellings
for all-year residence in municipality j. 
Table A.3. Part A.
Summary statistics (initial values).
Variables Mean Std. dev.
Woman 0.41 0.49
Age 32.19 12.11
Married 0.54 0.50
Children 0-2 years 0.19 0.46
Children 3-17 years 0.65 1.15
Country of origin:
Poland 0.02 0.12
Iraq 0.12 0.33
Iran 0.12 0.33
Vietnam 0.06 0.24
Sri Lanka 0.07 0.26
No citizenship 0.13 0.34
Ethiopia 0.01 0.09
Afghanistan 0.02 0.14
Somalia 0.06 0.24
Rumania 0.01 0.08
Chile 0.001 0.03
Former Yugoslavia 0.05 0.21
Bosnia-Herzegovina 0.33 0.47
Ex-Yugoslavia (excl. BH) 0.01 0.09
years of education: 9-12 0.17 0.38
years of education >12 0.13 0.34
Years of education missing 0.62 0.49
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Table A.3. Part B.
Summary statistics (initial values). Means (std. dev.).
Variables Mean Std. dev.
Immigration year 1985 0.03 0.17
Immigration year 1986 0.12 0.32
Immigration year 1987 0.06 0.24
Immigration year 1988 0.05 0.22
Immigration year 1989 0.05 0.23
Immigration year 1990 0.04 0.20
Immigration year 1991 0.05 0.21
Immigration year 1992 0.06 0.23
Immigration year 1993 0.04 0.20
Immigration year 1994 0.03 0.16
Immigration year 1995 0.32 0.47
Immigration year 1996 0.10 0.31
Immigration year 1997 0.06 0.24
Ethnic stock 10,171 5,718
Municipality of residence:
POP 98,446 135,970
PCIMM 3.19 6.29
PCETH 4.11 6.65
METRO 0.16 0.37
UNRATE 9.69 2.32
PCRVOTE 42.74 13.21
EDUCINST 7.84 9.79
PCJOB 22.73 25.40
PCSHOUS 19.70 11.20
PCRHOUS 43.29 15.88
Number of observations 36,718
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Figure A.1. Estimated Hazard Function for Exit from Assigned Municipality.
Figure A.2. Estimated Survivor Function for Residence in Assigned Municipality.
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